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Editorial
It is with considerable satisfaction that we have 
been able, fi nally, to continue the publishing 
of the Outlines. We must haste to excuse the 
delay of almost half a year in the publishing 
of this issue, and express our hope that our 
readership have been, if concerned, then not 
entirely put off.
From this issue on, the Outlines is produced 
and issued by the University Press of South-
ern Denmark. We are greatly enthused by 
this, since we are confi dent that this publisher 
is better able to handle an international and 
interdisciplinary journal such as ours.
This issue is a lot about science, artifacts, 
and discourse as constituents of human sub-
jectivity. One might say that, in continuity 
with earlier materials, and even with whole 
issues on technology and social practice, 
we attempt to close the gap after our tempo-
rary absence with fl ashing one of our strong 
points. As Ernst Schraube has pointed out, 
mainstream psychology’s attempts to model 
human thinking on machines has long kept 
it from the question of what matters about 
machines in people’s lives (Schraube, 2003). 
This is one area, then, where off-mainstream 
approaches such as cultural-historical activity 
theory and critical psychology, social practice 
theory, actor-network-theory, and foucauldian 
genealogy – approaches all represented in this 
issue – have a head start.
Of course, the fi rst thing one needs to real-
ize is that “artifacts”, “machines” etc. must be 
considered in broad terms if it is to be refl ected 
how we shape our lives with them. Termino-
logical questions aside, it is advisable to em-
brace the possibility of viewing forms of coer-
cion in prisons as technologies of subjectivity, 
as well as seeing complex machineries as em-
bodying relations in acts and practices. Some 
of that range is represented in this issue, and 
we do not at all suggest that we know where or 
whether to fi nd some organizing principle that 
will make it all fi t nicely together. Neither do 
we imply that any range of artifactualities or 
any structure of objectifi ed knowledge should 
be regarded as suffi cient representations, or 
complete regulations, of the everyday lives of 
living humans, nor can we be sure, for that 
matter, that it would be possible or desirable to 
draw a defi nite line of distinction between what 
is artifi cial and what is human. As Michael 
Cole puts it, human thinking is artifi cial.
Michael Cole, whom we are pleased to wel-
come back on the pages of the Outlines (his last 
appearance was in our ancestor Udkast 15 years 
ago), takes on the dazzling challenge of address-
ing equally audiences of activity theory and cog-
nitive science. So he traces cognitive  science 
as an endeavor which originally included the 
kind of cultural aspects which are at the center 
of activity theory, and which might do it again; 
he suggests that “the topic of culture as con-
ceived of by cultural-historical approaches and 
in cognitive science is worthy of consideration 
in thinking about the development of both disci-
plines”. This presupposes precisely a cognitive 
science which no longer confuses the properties 
of the socio-cultural system with those of the 
person. Thus, in order to map out those socio-
cultural systems, we need clear conceptual dis-
tinctions between human and artifact. 
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Even our past may be artifi cial. We can learn 
from Middleton & Murakami’s paper on remem-
bering and reconciliation that memory isn’t at all 
a mechanism-object located in someone’s skull. 
When we remember, when we deal with the past, 
we create and deal with objects that constitute 
communities and vice versa. This, of course, is 
no news for those who have known about the 
work of Middleton and colleagues on collective 
remembering. What is particular, here, is more 
the way in which that theoretical proposal is de-
veloped with the help of actor-network theory as 
well as veteran prisoners of war. What emerges 
is an account that is opposite Cole’s in that it 
deliberately blurs the distinction between human 
and non-human elements, and then must set out 
in search for other ways to achieve closure and 
establish discrete entities for analysis. Dave Mid-
dleton presented their paper at a guest lecture in 
Copenhagen in April, and we are happy to pass 
it on to our readers.
Erik Axel takes us in another direction. His 
theoretical deliberations were fi rst performed 
at the defense of his doctoral dissertation 
“Regulation as productive tool use” in the 
summer of 2002 in Roskilde, Denmark. Axel 
stays fi rmly within an account of human agents 
who use machines, however complex, as tools. 
The empirically grounded reworking of socio-
cultural and critical psychology which his dis-
sertation refl ects is fi rst and foremost situated. 
It is a call for concreteness, and, as such, pitted 
against any attempt at a scientifi c formalization 
of human activity which does not recognize 
its limits as tools that will always enter into a 
concrete, manysided praxis and negotiation. 
This argument is taken into even the tiniest 
details of regulation in the control room of a 
district heating system in order to demonstrate 
the general impact of everyday activity.
Huniche’s paper also presents her doctoral 
thesis which is as loyal to theoretical human-
ism as is Axel’s in seeking out the ways in 
which medical genetic knowledge form part, 
and only that, of how people with a disposition 
for Huntington’s disease deal with genetic risk 
in their conduct of everyday life. The critical 
aim is directed at not only the formalisms of 
the rationalism which underlies most genetic 
counseling, but also the ways in which its 
inherent individualism keeps us from facing 
major practical and ethical issues that surface 
once we simply start talking with people about 
how they collectively or individually get along 
with their histories, their daily lives, and their 
prospects with a hereditary disease as part of 
the landscape.
Jefferson, fi nally, opens the venue of an 
approach to activity which is a good deal less 
tied up in humanism, but in dealing with issues 
that are most often conceived as social rela-
tions, as therapeutic discourses and practices 
in a British prison are discussed with reference 
to Foucauldian conceptions of power. Yet as is 
the case with all the papers in this issue, even 
though they seem to point in quite divergent 
– even opposite – directions in some regards, 
the general theoretical backdrop (or network, 
or community …) which co-constructs the 
Outlines as a sense-making forum of debate, 
shines through. Perhaps, in particular, in the 
not-quite-so-anti-humanist way in which 
Foucault is appropriated into the fragile hope 
“that sites of therapeutic discipline might 
actually be “visionary spaces” and sites of 
genuine struggle both for prison staff and 
prisoners where change for the better both for 
individuals, organisational/relational structures 
and society might be facilitated”.
Morten Nissen
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